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ASSISTING THE JURY IN As GENERAL DAMAGES-Gray V.
Alanco Developments REVISITED.-
Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best,
be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of
measurement, and consequently the judge can, in his in-
structions, give the jury no standard to go by ; he can
only tell them to allow such amount as in their discre-
tion. they may consider reasonable . . . The chief reliance
for reaching reasonable results in attempts to value suf-
fering in terms of money must be the restraint and com-
mon sense of the jury . . . .
McCormick on Damages*
The assessment of general damages in personal injuries litiga-
tion is one of the most difficult tasks faced by a court' The basic
problem is that such damages' do not lend themselves to any form
of objective measurement in monetary terms. Judges sitting alone
have come no closer than juries to a rational basis for determining
damages for pain and suffering and for loss or diminution of the
amenities of life .' However, they have achieved some degree of
consistency in their awards-a feature which is frequently con-
sidered to be lacking from jury verdicts,'-largely through the
*(1935), pp . 318-319 .
1 The consensus on this point is universal, see e.g., Bird v . Cocking &
Sons, Ltd., [19511 2 T.L.R. 1260, at p. 1263, per Birkett L.J . ; Beagle v.
Vasold (1966), 417 P . 2d 673, at p . 675 (Cal .) ; Fleming, The Law of
Torts (3rd ed., 1965), pp . 210, 215-216 .
'The'-problems discussed in this comment relate mainly, though not
exclusively, to those non-pecuniary elements of general damages-for pain
and suffering and for loss of the amenities of life-as to which no evidence
directed towards quantification in monetary terms is permitted . Assess-
ments of pecuniary general damages in personal injury cases, e .g., for loss of
future earnings and for damages under fatal accident legislation, while
not free of difficulties present less of a problem because of the availability
and use of actuarial evidence . Though even in these cases some of the
problems here discussed can arise because of rules requiring the judge or
jury to take into account contingencies not allowed for in the actuarial
evidence, see e .g., Byron v . Williams (1968), 67 D.L.R . (2d) 111 (S.C.C .) .' McRuer, The Motor Car and the Law (1966), 4 Osgoode ball L.J .
54, at p. 69, suggests that "the judgment of the court . . . must in respect
of general damages be based largely on conjecture" . The reason why this
is so is that : "There appears to be no rational way of articulating a re-
lationship between the real loss which has occurred and the proposed
remedy, which is monetary compensation ." Weiler, Defamation, Enter-
prise Liability and Freedom of Speech (1967), 17 U . of Tor. L.J. 278,
at p. 336 .
"The Chicago Jury Project established, by trying the same case several
times before different juries, that jury awards vary considerably, even when
the evidence and arguments, etc ., are kept constant, see Kalven, The Jury,
the Law, and the Personal Injury Award (1958), 9 Ohio St . L .J . 158, at
pp . 172-173 . This was also demonstrated at a recent Advocates' Society
Workshop at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto,
January 16th-17th, 1970, when a case was tried before multiple juries
and a wide range of awards resulted .
I will argue in this comment that allowing the judge to inform the jury
of an appropriate damage range, as suggested by other similar cases, will
increase the consistency of jury awards . This argument is not based upon
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practice, express or covert, of being guided by previous awards
in similar cases.' So long as jury trials remain available in personal
injury cases,' a perennial problem is what assistance may a jury
be given in arriving at a figure for general damages.
In recent years in Canada and England this problem has re-
ceived judicial consideration. In Canada the focal point of this con-
sideration was the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Gray v.
Alanco Developments Ltd.' The primary purpose of this comment
empirical evidence derived from experiments with juries-though such
experiments would not be too difficult to carry out. Rather the argument
is based upon logical inference from the "empirical evidence" that judges,
who have knowledge of current award levels, appear to be more consistent
in their damage awards than are juries. I am not suggesting that arming
a jury with such information will produce absolute consistency in jury
awards any more than it presently produces such a degree of consistency in
judicial awards . I merely argue that such a change in our jury trial pro-
cedure will reduce the present degree of disparity in jury awards so that
they will approach the degree of consistency apparent in judicial awards.
'Through a line of cases beginning in 1951 this has become an express
and condoned practice in England, see Bird v. Cocking & Sons Ltd., supra,
footnote 1 ; Bastow v. Bagley & Co ., Ltd., [1961] 3 All E.R . 1101 (C.A .) ;
Singh v. Toong Fong Omnibus Co., Ltd., [1964] 3 All E.R. 925 (P.C.) .
When a case is tried by a judge alone or heard on appeal by the Court of
Appeal counsel is allowed to refer to awards in comparable cases : Ward
v. James, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 255, at p. 272, [1965] 1 All E.R . 563 (C.A.) .
In Canada the practice is less often an express one. While it is recog-
nized that uniformity of awards, so far as that is attainable, is a desired
goal, see e.g ., Hossack v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations, [1966] S.C.R. 28,
at p. 34, 54 D.L.R . (2d) 148, at p. 153, per Judson J., the practice of
counsel referring the court, or the court referring itself, to comparable
cases is not one firmly established by the case law as it is in England,
though both aspects of the practice certainly occur to some extent in this
country. The reason for this reticence in formalizing the practice is prob-
ably a desire on the part of both bench and bar to avoid the English "con-
ventional award" doctrine-that certain established awards should be given
for specified types of injury, e.g., between £4,000 and £6,000 for the
loss of a leg: see generally, Ward v. James, supra. In this regard it is
interesting to note that in Yorke v. Campbell (1967), 53 M.P.R. 278,
where the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appellate Division, looked at
awards in other comparable cases they stressed that such a reference may
serve "not as a criterion or standard of value-but as a guide" .
In both England and Canada bench and bar are well served with pub-
lications indicating the quantum of damages in decided cases, classified by
type of injury, e.g ., in England, Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of
Damages in Personal Injury Claims (1954) ; in Canada, Goldsmith,
Damages for Personal Injury and Death in Canada (1959) ; Canadian
Current Law; C.C.H. Insurance Law Reporter.s The availability and incidence of jury trials in civil actions in Canada
is discussed in the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Ontario)
(1968), Report Number One, Vol. 2, pp . 859-860. Only in British Colum-
bia and Ontario does the jury still play a significant role in personal in-
jury actions. Recently the Attorney General of Ontario announced (Globe
& Mail, Tuesday, April 21st, 1970, p. 2) that he would seek legislation to
end the use of juries in personal injury actions . This announcement pro-
duced a controversy in the Toronto press, fed by considerable opposition
from some members of the legal profession . Subsequently the Attorney
General announced (Toronto Star, Monday, June 15th, 1970, p. 8) that he
would not at the present seek such legislation .
'[19671 1 O.R . 597, 61 D.L.R. (2d) 652 reversing [1965] 2 O.R . 144,
50 D.L.R. (2d) 17 (H.C .) .
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is to examine the major holding of the Alanco case-that the
trial judge may not inform the jury of what, in his opinion, is an
appropriate damage award range.'
The decision in Gray v. Alanco Developments Ltd.
The Alanco Developments case involved an action for damages
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident . In the
course of his charge Haines J. stated that if invited by the jury
to do so-, he would advise them of his view of the possible range of
damages, having regard to awards given in other cases.' Sub-
sequently the jury returned and asked for some guidance as to the
range of general damages. After carefully warning them that they
were not bound by his opinion, Haines J. said:"
It is for you, but my opinion is that the lower limit would be in the
neighbourhood of $20,000.00, the upper limit in the neighbourhood
of $35,000.00.
It is clear that in rendering their verdict the jury gave little weight
to the learned judge's opinion for they assessed the plaintiff's
general damages at $71,000.00. The defendant appealed and
was granted a new trial, limited to the assessment of general
damages, on the simple ground that on the evidence the award was
so excessive as to warrant interference by the court. Though this
adequately disposed of the appeal, the Court of Appeal took the
opportunity to consider a number of questions, only one of which
was directly raised by the case before them. They stated that:"
As there appears to be some divergence of view among the trial judges
of this Court as to whether it was within the province of either coun-
sel or trial judges to express to the jury their personal views as to the
proper quantum of general damages or to state to the jury the amount
of such damages claimed in the statement of claim, we think it de-
sirable that we should consider the question raised by the second ground
of appeal .
Thus the court proceeded to consider these questions and con-
cluded that it was improper for counsel to mention the amount of
the damages claimed by the plaintiff or to mention awards in
similar cases, or for the presiding judge to express any view as to
the appropriate range of damages.
Informing the jury of the amount of general damages claimed in
the statement of claim
Over the years there have been conflicting opinions by Ontario
'Consideration will also be given to other aspects of the Alanco De-
velopments case and to subsequent Canadian cases . In addition, some
reference will be made to the American position on the issues here dealt
with.
'Supra, footnote 7, at pp . 599 (O.R .), 654 (D.L.R .) .
s° Ibid .
~l Ibid ., at pp. 598-599 (O.R .), 653-654 (D.L.R.) . Not all of these mat-
ters were directly raised by the grounds of appeal, as to which see, !bid.,
at pp. 597-598 (O.R.), 652-653 (D.L.R.) .
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judges on the propriety of counsel revealing the ad damnum
clause to the jury." In the Alanco Developments case the Court
of Appeal made reference to these opinions and then pronounced
th4t such disclosure was not permissible, for it:"
. . . does violence to the fundamental right of a litigant in a jury trial to
have the quantum of his damages assessed by a jury in the course
of a trial properly conducted. The jurors are sworn to reach a verdict
solely on the evidence. The amount claimed in the statement of claim
is not evidence . It is merely an opinion (frequently extravagant) of the
draftsman of the pleading of his view of the maximum amount that a
jury might award. It is not evidence properly before a jury . It is an
unsworn, unsupported, and biased observation .
While the court's ruling appears on balance a desirable one,
resting it on the ground that the amount claimed is not evidence
hardly seems satisfactory. None of counsel's address to the jury
is evidence in the action. The opening statements-which are not
evidence-will frequently consist of a summary of the allegations
in the pleadings. And yet this is not considered improper . Why
not then allow counsel to disclose his major allegation-the
amount of damages claimed? The answer, it is suggested, is not
merely that the amount is not evidence, nor that it will be extrava-
gant. Rather, it is that a real distinction can be drawn between the
likely effect of the mention of the amount of damages claimed and
the other aspects of counsel's address. The jury is warned that
counsel's address is not evidence, that their decision must turn
exclusively on the evidence, and that they should disregard any-
thing said by counsel and not supported by the evidence . It can
probably be assumed that this is not, in general, a difficult in-
struction for juries to understand and implement . Upon hearing
the evidence they can tell whether or not counsel's submissions
have been established . It is most unlikely, however, that one could
assume that a similar admonition would be very effective regarding
a reference by counsel to the amount of general damages claimed.
In the latter case, the jury has no standard to determine in any
objective or certain way whether there was or was not any evidence
to support such a claim for damages of the stated amount. The
only "standard" that exists, it is suggested, for measuring general
damages, is the awards given in comparable cases within the
jurisdiction. So long as this standard is concealed from the jury,
'Z In Bradenburg v. Ottawa Electric R. Co . (1909), 19 O.L.R. 34
(C.A.), Misner v. Toronto & York R. Co . (1908), 11 O.W.R . 1064 (C.A .)
and Stewart v. Speer, [1953] O.R. 502, [1953] 3 D.L.R . 722. It was con-
sidered unobjectionable for counsel to mention the amount of damages
claimed. In Yachuk v. Oliver Blais Co . Ltd., [1944] O.W.N. 412, affd.
[1945] O.R. 18 (C.A .), [1946] S.C.R., [1949] A.C . 386 (P.C .) it was held
to be a sufficient reason for striking out the jury . In the Stewart case,
supra, it was held to be objectionable for counsel to suggest to the jury a
range of damages (as opposed to mentioning the figure claimed) .
.Supra, footnote 7, at pp. 601 (O.R.), 656 (D.L.R .) .
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they are in no position to cope with the datum of the amount
of damages claimed by the plaintiff.
®f course the court's observation regarding the extravagance
of the ad damnum clause is not unimportant. The existing practice
limiting plaintiff's recovery to the amount of damages claimed
even though the jury's assessment is higher" already demands of
counsel a degree of extravagance in naming the damage figure
in the statement of claim. Further, it - is almost certain that if coun-
sel were to be allowed to inform the jury of the damage figure
claimed, such figures would become much more extravagant.
Under . our present rules for conducting litigation before a
jury, revealing to them, without more, the amount of general
damages claimed by the plaintiff, is likely to unduly influence
them . Consequently, it seems preferable to prohibit the practice .
This position has received little acceptance in the United
States . The majority of American courts take the view that a refer-
ence by the plaintiff's counsel during a jury trial to the amount of
damages claimed by his client is not improper." The reasons given
for permitting the practice have been numerous . Frequently it is
supported as being within the reasonable latitudes to be afforded to
counsel in addressing the jury: an attorney is permitted to discuss
all reasonable inferences from the evidence (and . the jury must
base its determination of damages on the evidence) therefore, if
any damages are recoverable, they must be at least inferred from
the evidence, and counsel may comment by suggesting a figure
supported by the evidence ." In jurisdictions where established rules
permit pleadings to be read to the jury, or taken by the jury to
the jury room or both, the practice of mentioning the ad damnum
clause rather automatically followed. In still other jurisdictions, the
acceptance of the practice found its roots in the rule that it was
proper or necessary for the court to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff may not be awarded any more than the damages claimed
in his pleading . One short (but unnecessary) step was to reason
that, to be meaningful, this instruction required the jury to be
told the amount claimed by the plaintiff." However, it should
be noted that American courts which permit the mentioning to
the jury of the amount of damages claimed, recognize that it is
not evidence, but feel that this problem can be overcome by an
instruction to the jury to that effect.
is This is the effect of those decisions refusing plaintiffs leave to amend
their claim for relief to conform to the (higher) award of the judge or
jury. See e.g., Van Den Heuvel v. Marchand, [19681 2 O.R. 185, Kong v.
Toronto Transportation Commission, [19421 O.W.N. 163 .is See Annotation (1965), 14 A.L.R . 3d 541 ."E.g ., Missouri, K. & T. Ry . Co. v. Hibbitts - (1908), 49 Tex. Civ. App .
419, 109 S.W. 228 .
it E.g., Phillips v . Rulghum (1962), 203 Va 543, 125 S.E . 2d 835 .
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The major impact of the majority American rule on personal
injuries litigation in that country has not, however, been the ex-
istence of the rule itself. Its real force has been its progeny! The
existence of the rule permitting the mentioning to the jury of the
total amount of general damages claimed has turned out to be
the "toe in the door" and the cornerstone of arguments for the
acceptance of the dream-child of the plaintiff's personal injuries
lawyer-the "per diem" argument for damages for pain and suf-
fering."
18 The "per diem", or "unit of time", argument by counsel is one that
suggests to the jury that, to arrive at a total damage figure, they consider
the segmentation of damages into a stated amount of money representing a
certain period of time, such as $5.00 for each day of pain and suffering .
In the Alanco case, supra, footnote 7, the court did not specifically direct
itself to the permissibility of this type of argument . However the rejection
of this form of argument would appear to be clear from the conclusion
that under no circumstances may counsel express his views to the jury
on the quantum of damages.
The subsequent Saskatchewan case of Didluck v. Evans (1968), 67
D.L.R . (2d) 411 (C.A.) is apparently the only reported Canadian case
touching directly on the question of "per diem" argument . There, in an
appeal by the defendant against the jury's damage award in a personal
injuries suit, one ground of appeal was that plaintiff's counsel in his ad-
dress had improperly attempted to quantify the general damages. Plain-
tiff's counsel, after stating that the female plaintiff would live for perhaps
another fifty years, had used these words: (ibid ., at p. 415) :
"If you look at fifty-one years you will find it comes out to something
over 18,500 days ; this is 18,500 days ahead of Mrs. Didluck in which
she is going to be disabled .
Now, as you can imagine, there is no compensation adequate for per-
sonal injuries of really any type, no one is going to enter into a con-
tract, for example, to have their hand cut off for say ten thousand
dollars, I mean you can't look at it that way, it is ridiculous, we really
have nothing to compare what the amount of damages should be. In
this case no one, no sane person certainly, would have their neck
broken if someone offered to pay them say two or three dollars a
day for life, you just wouldn't do it ."
The majority rejected the contention that this constituted a suggestion
by counsel to the jury that they award the plaintiff $2.00 or $3.00 per day
for fifty years . They were satisfied that in their entirety counsel's remarks
made it clear that the jury should avoid any such method of computation .
Hall J. . dissented . He was of the opinion that the remarks had the effect
of suggesting to the jury the amount of compensation which they should
award by way of general damages and this he held, quoting from the
Alanco Developments case, to be quite improper .
In recent years few issues in the area of tort law have evoked more
controversy in the United States than the "per diem" argument . The tech-
nique appears to have its genesis in an address by Melvin M. Belli in
1951) (reproduced in (1951), 22 Miss . L.J . 284) advocating its use as a
means of obtaining "more adequate" awards . See Gregory & Kalven,
Cases and Materials on Torts (1969), p. 460. A land mark decision by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Botta v. Brunner (1958), 26 N.J . 82, 138
A 2d 713, held this type of argument to be improper . In the eight years
following that decision over sixty cases from more than thirty-eight
jurisdictions considered the point with a preponderance finding the argu-
ment not to be improper (see Baron Tube Co. v . Transport Insurance Co.
(1966), 365 F. 2d 858 (5th Cir.) and Beagle v. Vasold, supra, footnote
1, for a comprehensive listing of the decided cases) . Some states have even
legislated on the subject and the issue has produced a plethora of com-
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Judicial expressions of opinion as to an appropriate range of
damages and statements by the fudge or by counsel as to awards
in similar cases
As stated above, in the 11lanco Developments case the court
held that neither the judge nor counsel may express any opinion
as to the quantum of general damages.
®n the question of counsel expressing views as to the quantum
of damages, the court felt that this was foreclosed by the general
principles applicable to counsel's addresses. In addressing the jury,
counsel is limited to reviewing and commenting on the evidence,
and to the making of submissions which may properly be sup-
ported by the evidence adduced. Counsel are not entitled to ex-
press their personal opinion on the evidence . Although the court
did not specifically so state, it is clear that they felt that in quanti-
fying damages, counsel would be expressing a personal opinion
on the evidence and not merely making comments on or sub-
missions based upon the evidence."
ment in legal periodicals. (The Baron Tube and Beagle cases, ibid., cite the
legislation on the subject and give comprehensive bibliographies of the
periodical literature .)
While the American cases have produced a mass of arguments for and
against the use of the "per diem" technique, a major starting point of the
decisions sanctioning this form of advocacy has been the rule permitting
counsel to inform the jury of the damages claimed by the client and thus
to suggest to them an appropriate global figure . Such courts reason that if
counsel is'-to be permitted to suggest a total figure he should be entitled
to explain how that figure is arrived at . Courts taking this position point out
that it is paradoxical and inconsistent to hold that damages in totality are
inferable from the evidence (a major rationale for mentioning the dam-
ages claimed) but that when the sum is divided into segments represent-
ing days, months or years, the inference disappears (e .g., Beagle v .
Vasold, ibid.) . It is in this way that the rule permitting counsel to mention
the damage figure claimed by the plaintiff has become the "toe in the
door" leading to the wide acceptance in the United States of the "per
diem" argument . The New Jersey court in the Botta case felt the weight
of the inconsistency described above and in rejecting the "per diem" argu-
ment overruled a long line of cases and held it improper for counsel to
advise the jury of the total amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff
or to suggest a total amount as reasonable compensation .
It is of interest to note that plaintiff counsel's address in the Didluck
case, supra, might also have been challenged as employing (albeit "nega-
tively" as was the "per diem" argument) the "Golden Rule" or "do unto
others" form of argument-one suggesting to the jury that they put them-
selves in the plaintiff's shoes and ask themselves what compensation they
would expect in return for enduring plaintiff's pain and suffering . Even in
the United States the weight of authority holds this form of argument to
be improper . See Annotation (1960), 70 A.L.R . 2d 935; Baron Tube
Company v. Transport Ins. Co ., ibid., at p . 862 ; Beagle v. Vasold, ibid.,
at p . 681 .is Supra, footnote 7, at p . 656 (D.L.R.) .
As has already been pointed out, see text of footnote 16, supra, and
footnote 18, supra, many American courts have rejected such reasoning.
The rationale of those American decisions allowing counsel to mention
the damages claimed or to use the "per diem" form of argument is that
damages must be inferable from the evidence and, since counsel are per-
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In ruling that the trial judge may not express an opinion on
the quantum of damages, the court recognized that the scope
permitted to the judge in his charge to the jury, is broader than
that permitted counsel in argument :"
The trial Judge, however, may not only review and comment on the
evidence, but he may also, provided that he warns the jury that the
facts are within their exclusive jurisdiction, that they do not have to
accept his views, express his personal views on the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses, but he may not go outside the evidence .
But this greater latitude did not entitle the judge to express an
opinion on quantum :"
. . . to permit the trial Judge to express such an opinion would be to
sanction opinion evidence unsupported by qualified evidence but based
solely upon the Judge's personal experience derived from the evidence
or verdicts in other cases.
As to this portion of the court's reasoning, one might question if
there really is a logical distinction between permitting the judge
to give his opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, as to which
there may be no direct evidence, but not as to the range of general
damages. In either case, the judge will be offering his opinion
as to the conclusion that the jury might draw and in both cases that
opinion will be based upon his judicial experience and upon what
has been adduced or transpired before him at the trial .
However, the court did not base its rejection of the practice
merely on the ground of such "legal objections". They felt that
certain "practical considerations" put forward by Lord Denning in
Ward v. James-" weighed against it. In that case, the Master
mitted to discuss all reasonable inferences from the evidence, they are
entitled to express an opinion as to the question of damages.
However, most courts hold or recognize that it is improper for coun-
sel to call to the attention of the jury the amount of verdicts in similar
cases . See Annotation (1963), 15 A.L.R . 3d 1146.
"Ibid., at pp . 601 (O.R.), 656 (D.L.R .) .
zi Ibid.
The issue of the trial judge suggesting to the jury a possible range for
damages, based on earlier similar cases, does not appear to have squarely
arisen in the United States . However, the judicial attitude on related is-
sues would seem to condemn such a practice. See Annotation (1948),
2 A.L.R. 2d 454, particularly at p. 481.
"Supra, footnote 5.
The Ontario Court of Appeal also put forward as a further argument
against the practice the known fact that judges vary considerably in their
individual appraisal of the proper quantum of general damages. Hence,
they reasoned, if Haines J.'s practice in the instant case were generally
pursued juries might well be given varying ranges of figures from case to
case depending upon the views held by the judge charged with the trial,
supra, footnote 7, at p. 603 (O.R .) . With respect, this argument is un-
convincing. It loses sight of the problem Haines J. was attempting to
overcome-the unpredictability of, and disparity in, jury awards . Certainly
judges vary in their damage awards, but to a much lesser degree than do
juries . Faced with the problem of overcoming the disparity in jury awards
it hardly seems reasonable or desirable to reject judicial assistance to the
jury on the ground that judges themselves are less than perfectly consistent.
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of the Rolls, speaking for the English Court of Appeal, rejected
the suggestion that the trial judge be permitted to apprise the
jury of awards in comparable cases, or to express an opinion as to
the appropriate range of damages . ge reasoned that if judges were
to be permitted such latitude, counsel must also have the same
right, and the result would be the confusion of the jury-through
the citation, and distinguishing, of other cases-and an unseemly
auction with each counsel pitching "the figures as high and low
as he dared","
The Alanco Developments opinion is an intriguing one. The
court's final reason for concluding that the judge may not guide
the jury by expressing his opinion as to an appropriate range for
award, was that to hold otherwise would be to "water-down"
the litigant's right to a jury trial :"
Surely any improvement is better than none ; certainly at least, where the
alternative is to leave the jury in its present position-without any guid-
ance whatsoever in determining compensation for the "unquantifiable"! .
23 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 472 (W.L.R.), 575 (All E.R.) .
In a recent case, the Ontario Court of Appeal, citing the Alanco
Developments case, applied the rule that counsel may, not mention to the
jury recent awards in other cases : Allan v . Bushnell T:V. Co . Ltd., [1969]
2 O.R. 18 (C.A.) . The circumstances of the case were somewhat unusual.
It involved an action for libel against the owners of a television station
which, had broadcast inaccurate statements regarding certain criminal
charges pending against the plaintiff . Similarly inaccurate statements had
been published or broadcast by a number of newspapers and broadcast
corporations, not parties to the instant action . In his jury address, defence
counsel referred to a settlement of $8,000.00 made by one such newspaper,,
and pointed out that if the plaintiff received a similar award in the instant
case, and in the other pending actions, he could -end up with a total re-
covery-of about $64,000 .00, which he suggested would be "astronomic" .
Plaintiff's counsel, in his jury address, attempted to counter this argument.
He did so by pointing out to the jury that in England recently a plaintiff
who had brought separate actions against two newspapers which had pub-
lished identical libels was awarded x.100,000 in one action, and ze 117,000
in the other. He concluded by suggesting that, in view of these awards,
the figure of $64,000 .00 mentioned by defendant's counsel was not an
"astronomical" one.
On appeal against the jury's award of $52,000.00 Schroeder J.A.,
speaking for the court, held that the defence counsel address was
proper since the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O., .1960, c . 211, s. 10, autho-
rizes the offering of such proof in mitigation of damages, but, he ruled, the
defence counsel's line of argument did not justify "the serious irregularity
of [plaintiff's] counsel in referring to the two English decisions as to the
facts and circumstances of which the jury were in complete ignorance",
[19691 2 O.R . 612 . After referring to the holding in the Alanco Develop-
ments case that counsel may not express their views as to the quantum
of, damages, Schroeder J.A . stated that "[t]he impropriety of what counsel
did here is too plain for discussion" . Ultimately, the court held that, quite
apart from whether the jury was or was not influenced by the improper
observations by plaintiff's counsel, the award was excessive and a new
trial was ordered.
While this case undoubtedly borders on the "unseemly auction" it leaves
unresolved the problem of how plaintiff's counsel is to be expected to deal
with this type of evidence, if used on behalf of the defendant in mitigation
of damages.
"Supra, footnote 7, at pp . 601 (O.R.), 656 (D.L.R.) .
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. . . [it] would be tantamount to countenancing his usurpation of
functions committed exclusively to the jury . Litigants exercising their
right to have their cases tried by a jury are entitled to the jury's ver-
dict, uninfluenced by anything extraneous to the evidence, proper sub-
missions of counsel thereon, the instructions of the Judge as to the law,
and his summing of the evidence, together with his comments thereon
and the credit to be given to it.
On its face, the court's decision appears to be one "striking
a blow" for the integrity of trial by jury . In the long run, however,
the decision may well be a nail in the civil jury's coffin .
The civil jury is under attack ." One frequent criticism of the
institution is the unpredictability of its damage awards . That
this is so is not in the least surprising . The major guideline that
judges have in determining general damages, is the knowledge of
awards in similar cases. This guideline, rather naturally, produces
relatively consistent awards ." The decisions of the Court of
Appeal of both England and Ontario, if followed, guarantee that
the civil jury will remain open to the criticism of inconsistency by
ensuring the jury's ignorance of the only factor which could pro-
duce consistency.
Is there no possibility of a contrary conclusion on this matter?
Are the arguments of the Court of Appeal irrebuttable? The
arguments genuinely supporting their position are essentially two :
(a) to permit judicial expression of opinion as to the possible
range of damages is to countenance a usurpation by the judge of
the jury's function ; (b) if we allow the judge to refer to like
cases or to express an opinion we must allow counsel to do so-
to the jury--and this would only confuse and mislead the jury.
Both these arguments, I believe, can be overcome.
The history of trial by jury is one of the development of
devices for controlling the jury. Today, as the result of several
hundred years of judge-made and statutory principles, we have
a wide range of pre-verdict and post-verdict devices for controlling
the jury . For example, the trial judge has a responsibility to make
rulings on the relevance and admissibility of evidence ; to enter
non-suits, directed verdicts, or dismiss actions for lack of sufficient
evidence ; to take cases from the jury on the ground of complexity,
or prejudicial conduct at the trial,"' to comment on the weight
25 McRuer, op. cit., footnote 3; Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil
Rights, op . cit ., footnote 6, documents the waning of the civil jury's role in
England and the Canadian provinces and recommends the abolition of jury
trial in Ontario in all civil actions other than those for defamation . As
pointed out, supra, footnote 6, the Attorney General of Ontario recently
announced his intention to seek legislation to implement the Royal Com-
mission's recommendation but has subsequently stated that he will not do
so at the present time.
26 It is probably fair to say that, in the final analysis, the only test
of the "correctness" of a general damage award in any given jurisdiction
is its relative consistency with awards in like cases within that jurisdiction .
21 E.g ., the mention of insurance .
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of the evidence ; to indicate his own opinion concerning the credi-
bility of witnesses and the relative strength of competing infer-
ences;" and to direct the jury, in appropriate cases, to answer
questions of fact rather than permitting them to render a general
or special verdict." With the development of these devices, the
jury has progressed from an almost autonomous decision-making
body to a legal organism, largely subservient to the control of
the bench." Although generally referred to as devices for control-
ling the jury, these devices may just as properly be described as
a means for guiding the jury in their deliberations." But however
described, it is these devices that have made trial by jury tolerable
to society. Whatever their description, these devices have been in-
dispensable to the continued existence of jurie$. Without them,
the quality of jury verdicts would have made the institution in-
tolerable not only to the profession, but to the public at large. A
jury without guidance or control would long ago have been abol-
ished. It has been the gradual eroding of the jury's function, the
continual redefinition of its role-indeed, the assumption by the
judiciary of what were originally the sole responsibilities of the
jury-that has saved the institution . To conclude, as the Court
of Appeal did in the Alanco Developments case, that permitting
the judge to express an opinion as to the possible range of damages
would be "tantamount to countenancing his usurpation of func-
tions committed exclusively to the jury" is to state a truism. : at the
same time, it is to overlook the history of the jury trial. Moreover,
it is to stop short of confronting the basic issue-how can we
best preserve, in aform acceptable to society, popular participation
in judicial decision making? The history of jury trial, it is sub-
mitted, provides ample authority for a decision contrary to that
arrived at in Alanco Developments. Furthermore, "freedom of
the jury from judicial interference", is not of itself a reason for
decision, rather it is merely a statement of preference for one
of the competing interests involved in the problem. Most significant
judicial decisions require a reconciliation or choice between con-
flicting interests and values. A sound decision on a major question
"Provided always that he makes it clear to the jury that it is ulti-
mately their province to decide such questions of weight, credibility and
inference .
"As is provided, for example in the Judicature Act, R.S.O., 1960, c .
197, s. 64(1) .
The post-verdict control devices are more limited in number-e.g., the
granting of a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, or is excessive or inadequate, or because of pre-judicial conduct
at trial, or by reason of misconduct in the jury's deliberations-but none-
theless give the judiciary further control over the jury's disposition of the
case.
"For a lengthy and excellent discussion of the development of con-
trols on the jury see James, Civil Procedure (1965), § 7-6-722 .
"At least with respect to the pre-verdict devices .
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raised by the Alanco Developments case requires reasons as to
why one competing interest should be preferred over others .
Are there convincing reasons for choosing competing interests
different to the one preferred by the Court of Appeal in its de-
cision? Are there sound reasons for permitting the judge to ex
press to the jury an opinion as to the appropriate range of
damages? I believe that there are.
First, armed with the knowledge-as judges now are-of the
current range of damages in like cases, juries will be more likely
to produce more consistent verdicts . To achieve this would be to
remove, or at least alleviate, a major criticism of the institution's
performance. Secondly, such an innovation would remove a rather
incongruous aspect of the present system of appellate review of
jury awards . Appellate courts have, and exercise, the power of re-
viewing jury awards that are so excessive or low that no jury
acting reasonably could have arrived at such a decision." When
an appellate court sets aside an award on this basis, what in
reality it does is to conclude that the award is so out of line with
prevailing awards in similar cases, as to justify or require judicial
interference. Surely this is a roundabout, and expensive, way to
control the jury. In effect what we do is to say that in order to
stand the jury award must meet a certain standard-that it be
not too far out of line with prevailing awards in similar cases .
However, we do not tell the jury what that standard is . They are
required to make their determination, and then, if necessary, we
have another hearing, at which a group of judges apply the
relevant standard . It is reasonable to assume that a jury apprised
of the standard its award must ultimately meet, will more often
meet that standard than a jury kept in blissful ignorance. The
end result will be not only a more rational system of determining
and reviewing damage awards, but an almost certain reduction
in the number of appeals regarding the quantum of damages
assessed by the jury."
" E.g., as in the Alanco Developments case itself." As the Alanco Developments case itself demonstrates, judicial ex-
pressions of opinion as to the appropriate damage award will not guaran-
tee jury awards that are consistent with prevailing standards.
Under the system here proposed, jury awards falling outside the
damage range suggested by the trial judge, will most certainly produce a
problem of appellate review. If appeal courts were to treat such a deviation
as, per se, a ground for vacating the jury's award, we would of course
deprive the jury of virtually any independent role in the assessment of
damages. However, properly approached, such deviations could make for
much sounder appellate review, and for more meaningful popular partici-
pation in damage assessment . Under the present system, if a jury returns,
let us say, a very large award and this is appealed the appellate court
has little if any, idea as to how the jury arrived at its figure . Whether the
jury simply pulled a figure out of the air, or whether it knew of awards in
similar cases and considered them inadequate, remains unknown to the
appellate tribunal . Under a system in which the judge can instruct the
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A final argument in favour of the judge apprising the jury of an
appropriate range of damages is one that rests, at least in part,
on conjecture . It stems from attempting to answer the question :
How do we explain the degree of consistency that does exist in
jury awards? Why is it that for a given type of case, for instance,
whiplash injuries involving no likelihood of serious future dis-
ability, many juries in a given locality return verdicts which are
roughly, or even vaguely, similar? . Since, ex hypothesi, there is
no formula for arriving at a figure for non-pecuniary damages,
why should there be any consistency as between decision-making
bodies who are, formally, kept ignorant of the awards in other
similar cases? A number of explanations are possible, for instance,
there exists in any given community a consensus among its mem-
bers as to the appropriate award for varying degrees of pain and
suffering, and for the loss of the amenities of life. While such
explanations are difficult to disprove, they are also difficult to
accept.
A more plausible explanation, for which there is some evi-
dence, is that juries frequently have information-obtained extra-
judicially-of damage awards, in past cases. As Professor Kalven,
Director of the Chicago Jury Project puts it :"
. . . the jury does have an informal sort of precedent supplied by
jurors with prior experience, by reading of cases in the newspapers,
and by general gossip in the jury pool.
It is extremely likely that jurors frequently have knowledge-
probably of an inadequate and imperfect kind-of the damage
awards in past cases, and that they use this information in arriving
at a figure in the case upon which they are sitting . The variation
jury as to an appropriate range of damages, based on other current
awards, a jury award outside the suggested range can be logically inter-
preted as an expression of opinion that the current award level is un-
satisfactory or inappropriate to the instant case . Under such a system it is
suggested that appellate courts would, and should, be more deferential to
these enlarged jury awards, than they are now. If appellate courts were
to act in this way, and since it is often considered that jury awards better
reflect inflation and the consequent decrease in the real value of money
than do judicial awards, we might achieve an overall system of damage
assessments 'that takes better account of our changing economic circum-
stances. In this regard the subsequent proceedings in the Alanco Develop-
ments case are of interest . A new trial, limited to the assessment of dam-
ages, did take place before a jury . On October 19th, 1967 this second jury
assessed the plaintiff's general damages at $60,000.00. Thus we have a
situation of two juries assessing the plaintiffs damages considerably higher
than the upper limit suggested by Mr. Justice Haines in the original trial.
(However I should point out that Charles McKeon, Q.C., counsel for the
defendants at both trials, has told me that he felt that the assessment of
$60,000.00 at the second trial was not unreasonable . In between th& first and
second trial the plaintiff's condition deteriorated considerably and Mr.
McKeon felt that the plaintiff proved greater damage at the second trial.)
No appeal was taken from this second assessment .
" Kalven, op. cit., footnote 4, at p. 164.
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of the level of awards from locality to locality, and from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, would be explicable on this basis" In the
United States, an organization of plaintiffs' lawyers have acted on
the premise that juries use known past awards in arriving at their
verdict. They worked towards raising the award "ceiling" in a
given locale and achieved the desired effect of generally raising
the level of damage awards through obtaining and publicizing
a high award."
If juries do use information about previous awards, obtained
extra-judicially, as a datum in assessing damages, surely it makes
sense to give them this type of information judicially : and to give
it to them in an accurate and relevant form-an expression of
opinion by the judge, based on current damage awards, of the
appropriate range within which they might assess the plaintiff
damages.'
What of the "practical considerations" referred to by the Court
of Appeal as militating against the judicial expression of opinion
as to the general damage range-the arguments that if this is
permitted, counsel must also be permitted, in the presence of the
jury, to express their opinion and if the judge refers to similar
cases, counsel must be allowed to distinguish such cases and cite
others . With respect, these arguments are not as compelling as
Lord Denning and the Ontario Court of Appeal assumed them to
be .
First, as to the argument that it would be "necessary" to give
counsel the opportunity to express their opinion as to the range of
damages, the necessity is not, with respect, apparent . Indeed, the
closest analogy suggests otherwise. We give to the trial judge alone
the right to express his opinion-his personal views-on the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses . Despite the fact that
such comments undoubtedly influence the jury's deliberations, we
do not permit counsel to contradict such observations in the pres-
ence of the jury, or to make comments of their own on the sub-
ject . The legal system has made the policy decision that the judge
" Belli, The Adequate Award (1951), 39 Calif. L. Rev. 1, documents
in great detail the differential level of damage awards in the various states
of the United States (at the time of that article) and points out that there
are clearly "high" and "low" states. Also, in Ontario it is generally ac-
cepted by trial counsel that there are clearly identifiable counties where
juries regularly make large or small damage awards .
3s Kalven, op. cit., footnote 4.
a' To speak of aiming for consistency in damage awards through ap-
prising the jury of awards in past cases is not to argue that damages for
various types of personal injuries should be conventional sums, identical
from case to case for the consequences of the same injury are infinitely
variable, see Haines, Criminal and Civil Jury Charges (1968), 46 Can. Bar
Rev. 48, at p. 51 . It is, however, to argue that it should be one of the goals
of our legal system to achieve roughly equivalent damage assessments
for plaintiffs whose injuries, complications and resulting circumstances
are similar.
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alone should be allowed to make such comments, in the belief
that the jury's deliberations benefit therefrom and would not bene-
fit if advocacy by counsel was permitted on these issues . The same
decision, for the same reasons, should be taken with regard to
expressions of opinion as to what would be a reasonable range
within which to award general damages.
The objection that counsel must be allowed to make reference
to like cases and distinguish those referred to by the judge, or
opposing counsel, can be dealt with in either one of two ways .
®n this point, the legal system may take a similar position as
that regarding expressions of opinion as to credibility-such a
matter is one solely for the judge. A position more compatible
with the adversary process, however, would be for the judge to
hear argument on this point from counsel-but to overcome Lord
Kenning's objection that it would only confuse and mislead the
jury-in the absence of the jury . In this way, the judge would
have the benefit of counsel's assistance in determining what are
similar cases and thus what range of damages might be suggested
to the jury .
The Alanco Developments case has not, however, been the
last word on the subject of judicial comment as to the possible
range of damages. The subject was again raised in the subsequent
case of Byron v. Williams." There, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada expressly reserved the decision in the Alanco
Developments case "for further consideration when the occasion
arises". But, despite this apparent express avoidance of the issue
it is difficult, as an analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions re-
veals, to read into the decision genuine doubts as to the desirability
of the Alanco Developments ruling.
In Byron v. Williams an actuary had given evidence at trial
in respect of the plaintiff's claim as executrix of the estate of her
deceased husband who had been killed in an automobile accident .
The actuary testified that a capital sum of $45,000.00 would be
necessary to purchase an annuity to produce, for the period of
the wife's expected life, an amount equal to the husband's annual
income. Landreville 3. in instructing the jury pointed out that
the actuary's figure, while a guide, was "very far off"" because
it failed to take into account a multitude of possible contingencies.
However, he then went further and stated :"
. . . any amount in that area, in my opinion, would be overly generous.
Just as much as if you award this lady $5,000 .00 or $10,000.00, 1
would say you are starting to be cheap and picayune on that score.
So that there is a limit, but that 1 give you a very wide margin, de-
pending on your. appraisal of those facts, of these contingencies of
as Supra, footnote 2.ss Ibid., at p. 117.
40 Ibid.
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which I have spoken, and then you can determine what might be a
financial security for this woman, to replace the financial security
which she had in her husband.
The defendant" contended that the trial judge had acted im-
properly and misdirected the jury by mentioning such amounts
"which might be called both a ceiling and a floor in relation to
the amount to be awarded"' and that this necessitated a new
trial on the issue of damages." The court rejected this contention .
While observing that "it would have been better if the learned
judge had not been as specific as he was in this instance"" they
indicated that the real question on appeal was whether what he did
say was misdirection of a nature requiring a new trial. Having
regard to all the evidence before the jury and the judge's charge in
relation to quantum as a whole" they were of the opinion that there
was no substantial misdirection and certainly no error constituting
a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of the Judicature Act."
Hall J., who wrote the majority opinion, stated that the court's
decision proceeded solely on the basis that in this particular case
the jury's assessment was reasonable" and ought to be supported.
This case, he declared, was decided "without reference to the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Gray v. Alanco
Developments Ltd." ." That case, he stated, "I would reserve . . .
for further consideration when the occasion arises"."
Ritchie J., delivered a separate opinion." While expressing his
full accord with the reasons of the majority and their disposition
of the appeal he felt that the Alanco Developments case was
" Who was respondent in the Supreme Court of Canada . He had suc-
cessfully appealed, as to both liability and damages, to the Ontario Court
of Appeal . The plaintiff then took a further appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada which reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal on both issues
and restored the trial judgment .
I The phrase is that of Hall J., supra, footnote 2, at p. 118.
OAR three members of the Ontario Court of Appeal had been o£ the
opinion that a new trial should be had on the question of quantum of
damages, on the ground of misdirection by the trial judge. It is not clear
from the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion on what basis the Court of
Appeal held there was misdirection, see, ibid., at p. 116. The decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal is not reported.
44 Ibid ., at p. 116.
'Hall J., who wrote the majority opinion quoted at length from the
trial judge's charge on quantum of damages in which Landreville J., set
out in some detail the basis upon which they must be determined and
stressing what the jury should and should not take into account. See ibid .,
at pp . 117-118.
4B Supra, footnote 29, s. 28, which .limits the granting of a new trial to
those cases where the omission or irregularity in the course of the trial
occasioned some "substantial wrong or miscarriage" .
°' Though not mentioned in either of the reasons for judgment in the
Supreme Court of Canada, the jury awarded the plaintiff $27,000.00 under
the Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 138, for the husband's death.
48 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 118.41 Ibid ., at pp. 118-119."Ibid., at pp . 112-113 .
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clearly distinguishable from the instant case . The decision in that
case, he reasoned, was limited to precluding a trial judge from
expressing his personal opinion, based on figures awarded in other
cases, as to the proper range of damages for such things as
pain and suffering-and loss of amenities of life ." In the instant
case, he continued, the judicial expression of opinion was given in
the context of explaining how the actuary'a figures were only a
guide, and in' using them the jury should take into account a range
of contingencies unexpressed by the actuary. As such, he con-
cluded, the trial judge's remarks did not appear to him to come
within the category referred to in the Alanco Developments case.'
It is not easy to interpret with any certainty either of the
opinions in the Byron case. Ritchie J., seemed to imply that in
cases where direct evidence quantifying damage is allowed, judicial
statements as to the possible range of damages may be permissible .
However, he refrained from expressly so stating and, like the
majority, his ultimate ground for decision was that in all the
circumstances of the case the mention of amounts was not a fatal
defect requiring a new trial. The majority, on the other hand,
stated that it "would have been better if the learned judge had
not been as specific as he was in this instance" regarding the
possible range of damages, implying that even in cases where
direct evidence quantifying damages is allowed, the. trial judge
should refrain from himself mentioning actual figures. This state-
ment by the majority makes its express reservation, for later con-
siderâtion, of the Alanco- Developments decision particularly dif-
ficult of interpretation . Had that reservation stood alone (or been
coupled with approval of the trial judge's statements in the instant
case) it might imply real doubt as to their willingness to accept
the blanket prohibition on judicial statements of opinion as to
the possible range of damages expressed in the Alanco Develop-
ments decision . However, if they objected to the mention of
specific figures by the trial judge in cases where direct evidence
is admissible as to quantities, it is difficult to see what reservations
they could have about the Alanco Developments ruling itself .
Conclusion
The issues underlying the matters discussed in this comment
"He considered the following quotation from the Ontario Court of
Appeal's judgment as disclosing the limited effect of the decision :
"what has been stated is applicable to those headings of general
damages where there can be no evidence as to the value in monetary
terms of the loss sustained, for example damages, claimed for pain
and suffering or the loss or diminution of the amenities of life."
Supra, footnote 7, at pp. 603 (O.R.), 658 (D.L.R .), quoted ibid., at p. 112.
52 He added that he agreed with Hall J., that, reading the trial judge's
charge as a whole, the mention of his opinion as to amounts to be awarded
was in no way a fatal defect . Ibid., at p. 112 .
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are several. Is it possible to give the jury meaningful guidance
in carrying out their task of assessing general damages? If so,
how can it best be done? In the background is, of course, the
further issue: do we wish to maintain our tradition of popular
participation in judicial decision-making in civil cases?
In the Alanco Developments case, the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal answered the first and basic question negatively (as did the
English Court of Appeal in Ward v. James) . Subsequently the
Ontario government has considered the possibility of the abolition
of civil jury trials in all but defamation cases . This development
might have been avoided had the court recognized its respon-
sibility for continually tailoring the jury's role to society's needs.
The holding in the Alanco Developments case was not one
dictated by any decisions binding on the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal," and the reasons given by the court for its ruling are less
than persuasive .
The court's formulation of an "across the board" prohibition
on any mention of damage figures by either judge or counsel may
have been motivated by a fear that any intermediate position
might open the door to the use of the American "per diem"
argument in Canadian courts ." If this were so, then I suggest that
denying the judge the power to inform the jury of an appropriate
damage range was an act of "over-kill" and an unnecessary step .
It is possible, and desirable, to formulate principles permitting the
trial judge to give the jury greater assistance in assessing damages
sa The Supreme Court of Canada's refusal, in Queen v. Jennings, [1966]
S.C.R . 532, to follow the House of Lords' decision in British Transport
Commission v. Gourley, [1956] A.C . 185 indicates that English decisions
are not binding on Canadian courts .
11 The history of the "per diem" argument in the American courts is
discussed, supra, footnote 18 . In the United States the use of the "per
diem" argument has frequently been associated with very large and, it
seems, ever increasing damage awards . Usually the argument is made with
the assistance of a blackboard or chart setting out in detail the damages
claimed by the plaintiff and the method by which counsel suggests the
jury arrive at such a figure . The following chart, used to depict damages
suffered by a plaintiff injured in an aircraft runway collision (Rattler v.
Arrington (1959), 111 So . 2d 82 (Fla) ), is typical.
Wendell Arrington
Age: 43 Expectancy : 28.8 years
To Date
Medical Expense $ 9,244.19
Pain and Suffering
12/8/55-1/30/58 783 days @ 15. 11,745.00
Physical Disability and Inability
to Lead a Normal Life
12/8/55-1/30/58 783 days @ 5. 3,915.00
Loss of Earnings
111 weeks @ 125. 13,875.00
$ 38,779.00
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without opening the door to an "unseemly auction" by counsel
through the use of the "per diem" argument.
Whatever be the reasons underlying the court's decision, its
unfortunate effect has been to leave the civil jury open to the
criticism that its awards lack any reasonable degree of uniformity .
To continue to deprive the jury of meaningful guidance in assess-
ing general damages is to sound the death knell of the institution
in the field of civil litigation.
What is the solution? I believe the courts should re-examine
the Alanco Developments decision . They should permit the trial
judge, after hearing argument from counsel on the subject in the
absence of the jury, to express, to the jury his opinion, based on
similar past cases, as to what would be a reasonable range for
the general damage award. An even better solution would be
legislation-not, in effect; to abolish the civil jury-but rather to
grant to the trial judge this power to bring meaningful guidance
to the jury's deliberations."
GARRY D. WATsoN*
(As used at the trial the chart itemized the medical expenses .)
In some instances plaintiffs counsel manage to persuade the jury to
award their clients the exact amount suggested by the "per diem" argu-
ment. For two such cases which have been reported see, Braddock v. Sea-
board Airline Railroad Co . (1955), 80 So . 2d 662, aff'd, 96 So . 2d 127
(Fla) (award of $248,439 .00 general damages to a nine year old boy
who had his leg amputated below the, knee as a result of a railway cross-
ing accident) and seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961), 364 P . 2d
337 (Calif.) (award of $134,000 .00 for pain and suffering to a forty-two
year old woman who received a permanently disfiguring and disabling in-
jury to her leg and foot) .
" Such legislation or a judicial reversal of the Alanco Developments
ruling is desirable even if the civil juries' role is reduced, in Ontario, to
sitting on defamation cases . The difficulty of assessment of damages in
defamation cases is at least as great, if not greater, than in personal in-
jury actions. See Weiler, op . cit., footnote 3 .
*Crarry D . Watson, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
* *
Puture
10,220 days 28 years
Medical Expense $ 500.00
Pain and suffering
10,220 days 10,220.00
Physical Disability and Inability
to Lead a Normal Life
10,220 days @ 3 . 30,660.00
Loss of Earning Capacity
To age 70, 27 years 162,000.00
$242,159 .00
